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On one of my trips abroad I found myself in transit at Amsterdam airport. It is not an 
enjoyable experience (to say the least) on the best of flights, but this one experience will be 
one I continue to remember with a mixed sense of pain and disillusionment. Airport security 
controls are not something unfamiliar to me, and again, I braced myself as I carefully unpacked 
the dubious objects from my handbag—a clear plastic bag containing my lip gloss, perfume and 
anti-bacterial lotion among other indispensable items, as well as my laptop. I don’t remember 
‘beeping’ as I walked through the security gate. Yet, I was hailed to step aside by a female customs 
officer who had been deemed as appropriate to physically examine my body—rub it from head 
to toe to ensure that I had not carefully strapped any explosive devices to my admittedly fitted 
clothing. She looked noticeably indignant, and she made no attempt to hide her scorn. I breathed 
deeply and walked into the curtained area where I was to be further examined. I had the sense 
that I was in for something different this time. The whole time, the power dynamics that were at 
play were so thick that they almost took on a presence of their own. 
With mocking disdain, and quite a heavy hand, she kneaded my body, and seemed somewhat 
disappointed that she had not discovered anything on me. Yet this ‘guise’ of appropriateness—
the gender of the person who was to effectuate the control and the curtain—turned into offering 
quite the opposite. At the hands and gaze of this woman, there was a clear attempt to humiliate, 
to dehumanize, to show me my place for that couple of minutes that I was subject to her power. 
Under any other circumstances, I would have case for a civil action for battery. While continuing 
to assert her power over me (after all, I could not catch my next flight if she did not let me pass), 
she kneeled down onto her knees and told me to lift my skirt. My heart beat fast as she examined 
me; I had a number of thoughts racing through my head. The instinctive lawyer’s response yelled 
out at me: ‘you know your rights Sevda! You don’t have to put up with this. You do not deserve 
to be treated this way, and this act is surely against the regulations’. I thought of Hannah Arendt 
and her commentary in ‘The Banality of Evil’. How in circumstances of systemic oppression, the 
simplest act, like switching on the lights at a concentration camp at night, can be vehicles for 
average people to participate in the inhumanity of the system. 
This woman seemed to me to be acutely aware of her role as cog in this wheel. And her 
intention to me was crystal clear: to debase me. But the strongest thought that crossed my mind 
(and the one that won out in the end) was that I would not give her that satisfaction. The mental 
gymnastics thus began: ‘Who does she think that she is? She is an employee of this airport’. So I 
said, with a concerted smile on my face: ‘Thank you. This is nice service—in most places you have 
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to pay for a service like this’. The tables had turned, and she had trouble disguising her shock 
caused by reasons other than my having spoken in clear, discernible English. She stood up quickly 
and scampered out of the curtained room making sure to avoid any eye contact. 
JUSTIFICATION AND INTRODUCTION 
I have dared to be more personal in my writing, to begin with a story. Using narrative 
technique is not new to the law1 , yet storytelling, “particularly storytelling written from an 
‘outsider’s perspective’, is a new form of legal writing that appears with increasing frequency on 
the pages of law reviews and specialized legal journals”2 . The outsider, as defined by one of the 
leading thinkers of critical legal theory, Richard Delgado, is a member of an ‘outgroup … whose 
marginality defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose voice and perspective—whose 
consciousness—has been suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized’3 . Critical race feminism as 
‘a new off-shoot of both Critical Race theory and feminism’ has similarly employed narrative 
techniques to bring a different voice4  into the ambit of critical legal thinking5.  The voices heard 
in the narratives ‘are not the judges and lawmakers who conventionally occupy our scholarly 
attention, but women: women who may also be minorities or members of other disadvantaged 
groups’6 . The interest in marginalia can be seen as reflective of general academic interest studies 
of ‘the other’: the process of othering made famous in 1978 by Edward Said in his seminal study 
entitled Orientalism7.  Indeed, such was the popularity of studies of marginalia in the late part of 
the Twentieth Century and early Twenty-First Century that it had led to claims that the centre had 
been decentred: 
These days, centrality is distinctly uncool. The centre has been marginalised, and 
marginality, like Bohemian Manchester or Cornish fishing villages, is the place to be. With 
so many groups muscling in on them, from sexual and ethnic minorities to dog-on-a-rope 
anarchists, the margins have grown so crowded that there is now standing room only. 
Indeed, they have bulged to spread over most of the page. Like elitism, marginality isn’t 
possible if too many people want to do it. It is an uncomfortable place, yet, oddly, it is 
where a lot of people want to be. In this sense it is a bit like Bangkok or the Aran islands. 
Yet, when distinguished British literary theorist and critic Terry Eagleton wrote back in 2001 
that outsiders were the new literary mainstream, he was conscious that although ‘migrancy 
and marginality are nowadays much touted, [they are done so] more by cultural theorists than 
by refugees stowed away in lorries’. The practical realities and lived experiences of marginality 
for outsiders, migrants being a case in point, are such that they tend to fall between the cracks 
of anti-discrimination law—they continue to be on the peripheries of legal protection. Mari 
Matsuda, another leading critical race theorist coined the phrase ‘looking to the bottom’ to 
describe the process of ‘adopting the perspective’ of those who have experienced discrimination8. 
Therefore, critical race theory posits that voices from the bottom have the power to open up new 
legal concepts. Paradoxically, bringing in the voices of outsiders has helped to make critical legal 
theory central to the legal canon.
This unlocking potential of critical race scholarship has encouraged me to redirect the 
scholarly lens upwards, from the lived experiences of those who are directly affected—those 
on the margins of society and law—to examine the (in)adequacy of antidiscrimination and 
equality law in redressing continuing marginalisation. In this paper I will offer the theory of 
intersectionality as the way forward to redressing existing gaps in antidiscrimination law 
for people at the intersections of multiple identities. After presenting the central thesis of 
intersectionality, and its history and continuing relevance, I will map a new ‘site’ of intersectional 
discrimination to demonstrate the dynamism and potential of the theory for women at the 
intersections—here, at the crossing of religion and gender, specifically cases of Muslim women. 
I will then move on to evaluate the European framework, looking specifically at cases decided 
by the European Court of Human Rights to distinctively argue that, though it can be seen to 
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have adopted an ‘intersectional’ approach, the European Court has applied intersectionality 
disingenuously, resulting in furthering discrimination against Muslim women. Having 
demonstrated that an intersectional analysis has already made its way into court practice, I will 
then offer recommendations as to how intersectionality theory can be positively brought into the 
courts in order to afford genuine remedies to women at the intersections of religion and gender 
who are victims of discrimination.
BACKGROUND
Born out of the characteristic dissatisfaction with essentialism in feminism, Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw’s influential legal theory of intersectionality made its entrance onto the world 
stage9.  As an advocate of anti-essentialism (the reaction against the existence of a common 
essential “woman”) Crenshaw introduced and promoted the concept of intersectionality, in 
which gender is merely one of many axes of discrimination that are simultaneously intersecting 
and mutually reinforcing. At the heart of the critique is an attempt to demarginalise intersecting 
identities. This assumes that various aspects of identity do not operate independently and 
that a ‘single-axis framework erases Black women in the conceptualization, identification and 
remediation of race and sex discrimination by limiting inquiry to the experiences of otherwise-
privileged members of the group’10. As part of her methodology, Crenshaw also ‘looks to the 
bottom’, taking the story of a key moment in feminist suffrage history and re-telling it, thereby 
looking from the perspectives of women of colour, whose stories are otherwise not told. She 
invokes the account of Sojourner Truth, an African-American slave who, with her powerful 
oratory, silences the crowd of male hecklers (an aspect of the ‘feminist’ story which is well-
known) but, also the white female activists at a women’s rights conference. Many white women 
tried to silence Truth, in vein, when she stood up to make her famous speech, vividly portraying 
the horrors of slavery on women. Truth thereby declared her equality as a woman before not 
only men, but white women as well. In doing so, Crenshaw reminds us that ‘this 19th-century 
Black feminist challenged not only patriarchy, but also white feminists wishing to embrace Black 
women’s history to relinquish their vestedness in whiteness”11. “Ain’t I a woman” thus became the 
catch cry of the intersectionality thesis in its attempt to re-imagine anti-discrimination law such 
that it captures the experiences of those on the margins of multiple intersecting identities, i.e., 
those at the grassroots: 
It is ironic that those concerned with alleviating the ills of racism and sexism should adopt 
such a top-down approach to discrimination. If their efforts began instead with addressing 
the needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged and with restructuring 
and remaking the world where necessary, then others who are singularly disadvantaged 
would also benefit. In addition it seems that placing those who currently are marginalized 
in the center is the most effective way to resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences ... 
12
In her legal analysis, Crenshaw carefully examines North American case law to persuasively 
demonstrate that anti-discrimination law is failing to account for and remedy the discrimination 
faced by black American women. She uses the image of an intersection of streets: 
Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow into one direction and it 
may flow into another. If an accident happens at an intersection, it can be caused by cars 
travelling from any number of directions, and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a 
black woman is harmed because she in the intersection, her injury could result from sex 
discrimination or race discrimination.13
This image thus suggests that disadvantage at the intersection of multiple identities is likely, 
not only to be more severe14 but it frustrates attempts to identify and allocate the responsible 
driver. 
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Extending the analogy then, ‘providing legal relief only when Black women show that their 
claims are based on race or on sex is analogous to calling an ambulance for the victim only after 
the driver responsible for the injuries is identified […] In these cases the tendency seems to be 
that no driver is held responsible, no treatment is administered, and the involved parties simply 
get back in their cars and zoom away’15. Thus, forcing women to filter their claims through 
specific single-axis categories, which are ill-suited to capturing their experiences, results in their 
claims not being heard and addressed. 
‘INTERSECTIONALITY FOR WHAT PURPOSE?’16 THE TWO WINGS OF INTERSECTIONALITY 
Twenty years after its inception as a legal discourse, intersectionality has witnessed 
exponential growth in its recognition as an important paradigm for sociological and cultural 
studies, and has permeated disciplines ranging from social work, psychology to studies of 
the labour market17.  Not surprisingly, it’s an increasingly contested concept, with criticisms 
that it is too complex18, internally conflicted19, and, ‘despite its popularity, there has been 
considerable confusion concerning what the concept actually means and how it can or should 
be applied in feminist inquiry’20. Further critics assert that intersectionality research ‘became 
dominated by sociological investigations of law as a practice that was generally ill-suited to 
achieve change’ and thus ‘focused on law as a medium of performing identities, instead of 
exploring law’s potential to contribute to overcoming disadvantage”21. Thus, as ‘the definitions 
of intersectionality have advanced, so too have the challenges levied against the concept22,’ 
exhibited further in Leslie McCall’s discussion about the ‘complexity’ of intersectionality.23
With the wealth of the literature available on the topic, it comes as no surprise perhaps 
that there are divergent views as to what an intersectional approach should look like, and for 
what purpose it should be pursued. Two threads—what I have termed the two wings of an 
intersectional analysis—can clearly be discerned: that intersectionality has a representational/
constructivist function, and secondly that it has a structural/systemic wing, without which the 
bird of equality and anti-discrimination cannot fly. Without looking to the structural oppressions, 
which lie at the heart of any claim of discrimination by those at the intersections of multiple 
identities, a state of equilibrium cannot be reached. This is precisely the concern that African-
American political scientist Jordan-Zachery expresses when it comes to ‘doing intersectionality’, 
that the ‘new insights into the conceptualization and definition of intersectionality trouble 
its initial conceptualization’24; that, while the way in which intersectionality is employed as 
a descriptive tool plays an important role, ‘focusing only on the descriptive analysis ignores 
the liberation/political framework of intersectionality”25. This becomes acutely manifested in 
the cases brought by Muslim women situated at the intersections of religion and gender. It is 
suggested that the unique potential of intersectionality is its power to address disadvantage at 
the individual level—giving a voice to the voiceless –and the structural level: 
Intersectionality is sympathetic and applicable to both the structural level of analysis and 
individual-level phenomena via its domains of power thesis, which recognizes the various 
terrains on which politics plays out, both structural and interpersonal. In recognizing both 
aspects of ‘intractable political problems’, intersectionality bridges part of the theoretical 
gap between critical theory, which often faces the dilemma of overemphasis on structural 
explanations, and liberalism’s privileging of the atomized individual.26
MAPPING NEW ‘SITES’ OF INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF THE 
MUSLIM WOMAN 
I began with this paper with my own experience as a subject of this intersection. Further, 
in presenting this paper at the ‘Conference on Migration, Family and Dignity’, in Doha, in March 
2012, I started by asking the questions posed by Jordan-Zachery, re-framed to fit where I find 
myself situated: ‘Am I a Muslim woman or a woman who is a Muslim?’ Like Jordan-Zachery, I find 
myself both excited and frustrated to be able to engage the issues intersectionality presents: ‘My 
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frustrations result from the fact that intersectionality is something I live every day. As I confront 
many of the challenges faced by [Muslim] women, it is not an academic exercise that I can simply 
leave behind when I turn off my computer. Intersectionality is not another analytical tool for me 
to pull out of my methods bag of tricks’ .27
It is my hope that by utilising my own experiences, and extrapolating to the way courts 
deal with discrimination against women similarly situated, I am able to illustrate the continuing 
efficacy of intersectional methodology. I have sought to use my narrative, in line with the classic 
approach of intersectional analysis as set out in the early narrative essays that defined the field, 
where “narratives take as their subject an individual or an individual’s experience and extrapolate 
illustratively to the broader social location embodied by the individual. Often such groups are 
‘new’ groups in the sense of having been named, defined, or elaborated upon in the process of 
deconstructing the original dimensions of the master category”28. With the banning of religious 
symbols—including the Muslim headscarf, the hijab—across European states, I now turn to an 
analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, and its assessment of cases brought before 
it in the strong tide of Muslim women turning to the court for relief. The two cases that will be 
examined relate to the ban of the hijab in education: Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001)29 and Sahin v. 
Turkey (2005)30.
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK: DISINGENUOUS INTERSECTIONALITY 
There has been a steadily increasing amount of literature on intersectional discrimination 
against Muslim women. In the recent volume on ‘European Union Non-Discrimination Law and 
Intersectionality’, various authors have tackled the issues that arise. Indeed, it is taken as a given 
that ‘new manifestations of disadvantage at the intersections of ethnicity, language, religion and 
gender have emerged, with the consequence that the situation of Muslim and Romani women in 
Europe has become a seismograph revealing the effectiveness of the response of EU equality law 
to intersectional discrimination”31. Roseberry, for example, establishes that judicial approaches 
to bans of the Muslim headscarf are heavily influenced by the assimilationist paradigm, which 
makes a sharp distinction between identity and behaviour 32. Further, in her analysis of legal 
responses in France and Germany, Fehr posits that what is in fact at play is an intersectional 
analysis: what she terms ‘intersectional prejudice’—that ‘when one reflects on the core 
assumptions on which the laws are based, the headscarf controversies reveal more than mere 
coincidental intersectional discrimination” 33.
When brought before the Court, cases involving discrimination against Muslim women 
are usually framed as the freedom of religion or belief (Article 9) or discrimination on the basis 
of religion (Article 14), the prior being categorised as a human rights claim and the latter being 
a case falling under equality or non-discrimination law34. Yet, regardless of how the cases are 
framed, ‘the courts have generally upheld these dress codes against both kinds of claims’35. In her 
newly published book, Howard reaches the same conclusion after an examination of the bans on 
religious symbols as a breach of the human right to freedom of religion, and as a breach of anti-
discrimination laws. She concludes that the cases are more than likely to have exactly the same 
result36. Thus, Muslim women are being discriminated against in education and their voices are 
not heard. Their cases are falling through the cracks, highlighting the urgent need to re-imagine 
the purposes of anti-discrimination law, with the methodology envisaged by Crenshaw—namely, 
to identify the “dominant ideologies” at play in structural discrimination by revealing deep-
seated underlying assumptions that permeate European society as a whole.37
How can an intersectional approach assist here? It has been argued that the court has in 
fact utilised an intersectional approach when assessing such claims. I would like to probe this 
view in order to ascertain the shape that an intersectional analysis takes and for what purpose, 
by assessing the court’s reasoning in two leading cases: Dahlab and Sahin. I hope to show that 
by looking to the second purpose of intersectionality theory—as a way of redressing structural 
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injustices—the cases fall short of what can be properly defined as an intersectional framework. 
In Dahlab, a primary school teacher was prohibited from wearing the Islamic headscarf (hijab) 
in the performance of her teaching duties. Notably, there were no complaints from parents of 
the teacher’s pupils. She complained of sex discrimination before the European Court of Human 
Rights and was dismissed by the court on the grounds that the measure ‘was not directed at her 
as a member of the female sex’ and that it is ‘a measure that could also be applied to a man who, 
in similar circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identified him as a member of a different 
faith’. Here we have the prototypical intersectional situation, wherein a Muslim woman’s case 
is dismissed because a Muslim man is not affected in the same way, and the ban does not 
significantly impinge on the rights of (non-Muslim) women, generally. This single-ground legalistic 
construction thus appears to completely reduce the reality of the lived experiences of Muslim 
women in the European context. In fact, in its analysis, the court goes further, to justify the 
prohibition in terms of the protection of gender equality: 
‘It cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of 
proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is 
laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the 
principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an 
Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality 
and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils. 
Thus, without any attempt to explain its conclusions, the court summarily dismissed Dahlab’s 
sex-discrimination claim by relying on the generalisation that the headscarf is irreconcilable 
with gender equality. By contrast, Leyla Sahin brought her case not as a discrimination case per 
se, but as a violation of her freedom of religion and belief. The applicant did rely on Article 14, but 
not on the single ground of gender but on religion. Notwithstanding, the judgment is thick with 
statements on gender equality. In its Sahin judgment, the court relied heavily on its decision in 
Dahlab. As Vakulenko observes, it is difficult to see how the court could have taken any account 
of the interaction of Sahin’s gender with her religion (in the single-ground approach of the 
court, only the latter had been claimed), yet ‘both gender and religion act as decisive structural 
forces in the judgment’38, albeit as necessarily at odds with each other. Due to the centrality of 
these structural forces in the judgment, the case is read by Vakulenko as “both a promise and a 
disappointment for intersectionality”. The promise rests on the fact that structural forces are 
considered by the court. But its promise is also the very thing that undermines its analysis—
according to Vakulenko, the court makes no attempt to connect the context to the particular 
applicant. However, I respectfully differ from Vakulenko’s analysis: Even if the court had directly 
applied this context of the antagonism between gender and religion to the individual applicant 
in this particular case, the structural forces identified (i.e. the context) is used to perpetuate 
existing misconceptions about Muslim women—assumptions that the court makes no attempt 
to explain; they are simply stated as given. Here, the term ‘intersectional prejudice’ manifests 
itself. According to the two wing approach identified above, I posit that this is not ‘doing 
intersectionality’. In its conscious desire to lift those women who are marginalised from the 
structural discrimination that they continue to face, intersectionality cannot, by definition, be a 
negative process. Specifically, it cannot be used to deny women at the intersections of multiple 
identities a remedy against discrimination. This is the liberating power of intersectionality, 
that it seeks to re-imagine anti-discrimination law, though not only through a deconstruction 
of legal consciousness, but through the exposure of the ‘otherness dynamic enthroned within 
the maintenance and perpetuation of white race consciousness’ which ‘seems to be at least as 
important as legal consciousness in supporting the dominant order’39. 
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INTERSECTIONALITY AS A WAY FORWARD FOR ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
As can be seen from the two leading cases of the European Court of Human Rights of 
Dahlab and Sahin, assessments as to broader structural forces and context have already 
made their way into court practice. Although this process has been heralded as promising 
in terms of intersectionality, I have shown that it falls short of satisfying the two ‘wings’ 
of intersectionality—what I have termed disingenuous intersectionality, at best. Thus, the 
adoption of a contextual approach per se cannot be seen as an intersectional approach. This 
must be accompanied by the added and essential requirement, speaking to the purpose of 
intersectionality, that it should be utilised with a view to lifting those on the margins out of 
structural discrimination. ‘Doing intersectionality’, therefore, necessitates that it is carried out 
with the conscious aim to redress entrenched and structural discrimination against people at 
the intersections of multiple identities. In ‘doing intersectionality’ one cannot underestimate 
the importance of paradigm-shifting—re-imagining equality law after having brought in to the 
centre the voices of the marginalised and victims of structural discrimination. This is what will 
ensure the continuing relevance of intersectionality for the law and that it is employed with the 
primary view to remedying structural injustice. This is not identity politics for its own sake, but 
with a fixed purpose. Thus, it is imminently flexible in order to continue to re-imagine the law as 
circumstances demand. It is showing that it is perfectly capable of being adopted into judicial 
and quasi-judicial settings. At the international human rights level, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (the oversight Committee for the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966) has expressly recognised intersectional discrimination40. On the 
domestic scene, for the first time after having being devised over twenty years ago, the grounds 
of intersectional discrimination found its way into an act of parliament. In fact, it was (almost) 
codified into national law in the United Kingdom. That the provision has since been shelved 
indicates rigorous debate and steadfast attention to the cause. 
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